Chapter

Freedom

Christopher Peacocke

in Being Known

Published in print March 1999 | ISBN: 9780198238607
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598197 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198238606.003.0007
 Freedom

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A reflective person is free to do something just in case there is a close possibility in which he tries to do it, and he would do it if he tried to. On this account, it can be shown that this inference is invalid: ‘If someone is not free not to be F, and it is causally necessary that if he is F, then he is G, then: he is not free not to be G’. This account of freedom is compatibilist, and attributions of freedom involve a substantive metaphysical commitment, rather than being a non‐factual or practical matter.

Keywords: close possibility; compatibilism; freedom; non‐factual

Chapter.  16843 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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