Chapter

Proper Sensibles and Secondary Qualities

Stephen Everson

in Aristotle on Perception

Published in print February 1999 | ISBN: 9780198238638
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597374 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198238630.003.0004
 Proper Sensibles and Secondary Qualities

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Everson argues that Aristotle does not think of colours, sounds, as secondary qualities; rather, all sensible qualities for Aristotle are primary qualities. This implies a very ‘direct’ notion of perception; for instance, I see red because my eye undergoes a change, a material alteration that can be fully accounted for in non‐perceptual terms. This alteration differs form non‐perceptual alteration in that it involves awareness. Everson concludes that the textual evidence in both the psychological and physical works supports the literalist reading.

Keywords: alteration; awareness; change; primary qualities; psychological and physical works; secondary qualities; sensible qualities

Chapter.  15255 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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