Colin McGinn

in Ethics, Evil, and Fiction

Published in print June 1999 | ISBN: 9780198238775
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598005 | DOI:

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This chapter is an extensive critique of the thesis of moral psychologism. Appealing to the Naturalistic Fallacy, McGinn argues that moral psychologism, as instanced in emotivism, the dispositional theory of goodness and relativism, confuses what ought to be the case with what is the case, psychologically. After a discussion of moral intentionality, McGinn concludes that goodness and other moral values are not mental properties but conceptually primitive, evaluative properties that have no place in an empirical science like psychology.

Keywords: emotivism; goodness; moral intentionality; moral properties; moral psychologism; naturalistic fallacy; relativism

Chapter.  11245 words. 

Subjects: Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art

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