Chapter

Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick‐Dretske analysis

Edward Craig

in Knowledge and the State of Nature

Published in print January 1999 | ISBN: 9780198238799
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597237 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198238797.003.0003
 Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick‐Dretske analysis

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The author contends that in the state of nature we need some detectable property of informants that correlates well with their being right about p. This yields a twofold criticism of Robert Nozick's truth‐tracking analysis of knowledge. First, it is not necessary that the informant be a good tracker in all close possible worlds, merely those that are open possibilities, those the inquirer cannot rule out as being non‐actual. Second, the inquirer cannot set herself directly to pick out a good tracker of p, so Nozick's favoured knowledge‐conferring property lacks the necessary epistemic accessibility.

Keywords: epistemic accessibility; Nozick; possibility; possible worlds; truth‐tracking analysis

Chapter.  2750 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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