Chapter

Externalist and Internalist analyses. The first‐person case. Knowing that one knows

Edward Craig

in Knowledge and the State of Nature

Published in print January 1999 | ISBN: 9780198238799
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597237 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198238797.003.0008
 Externalist and Internalist analyses. The first‐person case. Knowing that one knows

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Participates in the internalism–externalism debate and offers broad support to the latter. If we consider evaluating others as potential informants (the third‐person perspective), externalism seems right, for the subject's awareness of her fulfilment of the third condition for knowledge is neither necessary for her to be a good informant nor for her to be regarded as an informant at all. If the inquirer judges her own trustworthiness as an informant (the first‐person perspective), then she will be in that extra state, which internalism adds to the externalist account. Yet the extra state need not be built into the concept of knowledge, for being a good informant does not require being aware of fulfilling the third condition; relatedly, one can know without knowing that one knows.

Keywords: externalism; first‐person perspective; internalism; knowledge; third‐person perspective

Chapter.  3463 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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