Chapter

Objectivisation and scepticism. Unger's first account

Edward Craig

in Knowledge and the State of Nature

Published in print January 1999 | ISBN: 9780198238799
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597237 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198238797.003.0012
 Objectivisation and scepticism. Unger's first account

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Discusses scepticism of the kind exemplified by Descartes's deceitful demon thought experiment, and argues that we need to find the seeds of both scepticism itself and of the resistance to it in the everyday concept of knowledge. Operating with the explicated concept, this means attributing to it a suitable degree of objectivization. Peter Unger's argument for scepticism, which suggests that the objectivization involved is absolute, is rejected on the grounds that there are no identifiable practical factors that would push the process that far and that the suggestion leaves the extent of the resistance to scepticism a mystery. Craig concludes that the explicated concept reflects practical factors that cause objectivization to stop short of scepticism but that the very impetus of objectivization also pushes us towards it.

Keywords: Descartes; evil demon; knowledge; objectivization; scepticism; Unger

Chapter.  7146 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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