Chapter

The Identity Argument

Quassim Cassam

in Self and World

Published in print June 1999 | ISBN: 9780198238959
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597176 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198238959.003.0004
 The Identity Argument

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This chapter examines two versions of the Identity Argument. The concept version states that consciousness of one's own identity as the subject of different experiences requires the conception of oneself as a physical object. The intuition version states that consciousness of one's own identity as the subject of different experiences requires intuitive awareness of oneself as a physical object. The intuition version is shown to be plausible. Kant's defence of consciousness of the identity of the self is shown to be unsatisfactory.

Keywords: Identity; Kant; self

Chapter.  24166 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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