Quassim Cassam

in Self and World

Published in print June 1999 | ISBN: 9780198238959
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597176 | DOI:

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Derek Parfit's Reductionist view of persons is a combination of reductionism about personal identity and the impersonal description thesis. This chapter argues against the impersonal description thesis, the thesis that it is possible to give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist. It considers whether reductionism can accommodate the epistemological primacy of memory and the fact that it is not possible to give a full specification of the content of an I‐thought without ascribing it to a particular person.

Keywords: impersonal; I‐thoughts; memory; Parfit; personal identity; persons; reductionism

Chapter.  12442 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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