Chapter

Maximization: Some Evaluative Problems

Michael Stocker

in Plural and Conflicting Values

Published in print October 1992 | ISBN: 9780198240556
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598463 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198240554.003.0011

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

 Maximization: Some Evaluative Problems

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Addresses the central claim of maximization that we must do what is best. It is argued that maximization is neither morally nor rationally required. Maximization cannot adequately deal with the ethical concepts of superogation, self‐regard, amusement, and friendship; furthermore, the central claims of moral and rational choice do not involve maximization. Moral and rational appraisal of a choice of action requires evaluating its contribution to a whole (a life or a project), where the whole need not be the best available, only good enough.

Keywords: maximization; moral choice; rational choice

Chapter.  14504 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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