Chapter

Puzzles About Science

Terence Irwin

in Aristotle's First Principles

Published in print April 1990 | ISBN: 9780198242901
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597770 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198242905.003.0007

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

 Puzzles About Science

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Aristotle’s account of scientific knowledge implies that dialectic cannot itself give sufficient reason for claiming to have found first principles of science. Thus, Aristotle owes some different account of our grasp of first principles; and he needs to show that it does not raise puzzles worse than those it avoids. This chapter argues that Aristotle sketches the appropriate sort of account, and that the puzzles it raises are serious enough to justify the reexamination of the assumptions that lead him to it.

Keywords: Aristotle; science; first principles; intuition; dialectic; puzzles

Chapter.  7261 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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