Chapter

Soul and Mind

Terence Irwin

in Aristotle's First Principles

Published in print April 1990 | ISBN: 9780198242901
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597770 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198242905.003.0014

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

 Soul and Mind

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Aristotle views perception as a single faculty of the soul. Thus, he should display the unity of the faculty in different animals that have it. The perceptive faculty is shared by rational and non-rational animals; a common account of perception should show that it is not a mere homonym present in non-rational animals. The general account of perception should require no more than can be ascribed to non-rational animals, and in rational animals, the account should not be falsified by the distinctive features of rational perception.

Keywords: Aristotle; sense; perception; soul; mind; animals

Chapter.  11862 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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