Chapter

A Classical Form of Sceptical Argument

Peter Unger

in Ignorance

Published in print January 1978 | ISBN: 9780198244172
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191711473 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198244177.003.0002

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

 A Classical Form of Sceptical Argument

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Discusses, and expands on, the Cartesian skeptical argument. According to this argument, we do not have knowledge about the external world since we cannot know that we are not being deceived into having false beliefs about the external world. The chapter strengthens this argument in order to establish that such knowledge is not even possible, and extends it to exclude knowledge about other times as well. It rejects G. E. Moore's reversal of the skeptical argument as counterintuitive. Anticipating the discussions in later chapters, a prima facie case is made for the impossibility of even reasonably believing anything about the external world, and for the consonance of the skeptical results with considerations about certainty.

Keywords: certainty; deception; Descartes; external world; knowledge; G. E. Moore; other times; reasonable belief; skeptical argument

Chapter.  17006 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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