Chapter

Fanaticism and Amoralism

R. M. Hare

in Moral Thinking

Published in print December 1981 | ISBN: 9780198246602
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597596 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198246609.003.0010
Fanaticism and Amoralism

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There are fanatics and amoralists whose inability or refusal to face facts, or think clearly, or for other reasons present a problem for moral theory. The amoralist refrains from making moral judgements at all or makes only judgements of moral indifference. The fanatic makes moral judgements, but clings to them in a peculiarly obdurate way, which resists critical thinking. Hare goes on to formulate the amoralist position and shows why only one version of the position is tenable. Amoralism is an option left open by our system of moral reasoning. All that can be done to prevent agents from choosing to be amoralists is to provide reasons of a non‐moral sort.

Keywords: amoralism; fanaticism; moral judgement; morality

Chapter.  7039 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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