Objectivity and Rationality

R. M. Hare

in Moral Thinking

Published in print December 1981 | ISBN: 9780198246602
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597596 | DOI:
 Objectivity and Rationality

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Moral philosophers have been largely concerned with the question of whether moral judgements are objective or subjective. In most senses, moral judgements are neither objective nor subjective, and the belief that they have to be one or the other is the result of a fundamental error (e.g. descriptivism), which both objectivists and subjectivists make. The rationality of moral thought rests on there being a system of reasoning for deciding which of the principles of rationality to adopt called critical thinking. In preferring what we prefer, morality compels us to accommodate ourselves to the preference of others, and this has the effect that when we are thinking morally and doing it rationally we shall all prefer the same moral prescriptions about matters that affect other people.

Keywords: morality; objectivity; rationality; subjectivism; subjectivity

Chapter.  8286 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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