Personal Identity and Rationality

Derek Parfit

in Reasons and Persons

Published in print January 1986 | ISBN: 9780198249085
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598173 | DOI:
 Personal Identity and Rationality

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Examines whether, if a reductionist view is true, we have any reason for special concern about our own future and gives extreme and moderate answers. It offers an argument against the Classical Self‐interest Theory, defending a discount rate, not with respect to time itself, but with respect to the degree of psychological connectedness between ourselves now and ourselves at different future times. It also presents the immorality of imprudence.

Keywords: concern; immorality; imprudence; personal identity; prudence; rationality; reason; reductionism; self‐interest

Chapter.  6458 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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