Chapter

Kantian Objects

Christopher Janaway

in Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy

Published in print July 1999 | ISBN: 9780198250036
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597817 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198250037.003.0003
 Kantian Objects

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Kant's central contribution to theoretical philosophy was the position he called ‘transcendental idealism’. Schopenhauer also adopted transcendental idealism, though he wanted to modify Kant's position considerably, as evidenced in his long ‘Critique of the Kantian Philosophy’ appended to The World as Will and Representation. This chapter outlines Kant's idealism, comparing it with the idealism of Berkeley, examining the limitation of knowledge to appearances as opposed to the thing in itself, and the a priori principles that govern the world of empirical objects. Schopenhauer's often critical reception of these notions is emphasized, against the background of problems with transcendental idealism that had been raised by Kant's immediate successors.

Keywords: appearances; Berkeley; Kant; Schopenhauer; thing in itself; transcendental idealism

Chapter.  18250 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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