Chapter

Idiopsychological Ethics

Henry Sidgwick

in Essays on Ethics and Method

Published in print December 2000 | ISBN: 9780198250234
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598432 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198250231.003.0029

Series: British Moral Philosophers

 Idiopsychological Ethics

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This paper is Sidgwick's second critique of aspects of James Martineau's Types of Ethical Theory. Sidgwick begins by highlighting Martineau's unwarranted assumption that if his idiopsychological account is presented to a variety of individuals, they will each provide the same story as his on what the moral sentiment says about its own experience. In short, if presented with similar impulses or incentives to action, people's moral judgments will be similar. Concluding that Martineau's account is erroneous, Sidgwick adopts a view that recognizes irreducible differences in people's moral judgments.

Keywords: action; idiopsychological; James Martineau; moral judgment; moral sentiment; Sidgwick

Chapter.  6519 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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