Chapter

The Possibility of Knowledge of Necessary Truths

Hugh Rice

in God and Goodness

Published in print April 2000 | ISBN: 9780198250289
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598302 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198250282.003.0004
 The Possibility of Knowledge of Necessary Truths

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Concerned with the question of how our beliefs in necessary truths can be reasonable. In the course of considering this general question, I argue that our belief in objective value—that some things are good and others bad—commits us to the view that such beliefs are capable of being reliable, at least to some extent. And this belief in reliability, in its turn, commits us to the idea that value can make a difference; that the fact that it would be good that something should be so, for instance, can have a bearing on the ways things are—by having a bearing on what beliefs we form. So objective goodness can explain.

Keywords: knowledge; necessary truths; necessity; objective goodness; reliability; truth; value

Chapter.  4242 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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