R. M. Hare

in Sorting Out Ethics

Published in print February 2000 | ISBN: 9780198250326
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597602 | DOI:

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Naturalism is a species of descriptivism, and is described as the proposal to specify the truth conditions of moral statements without reference to moral words, i.e. without reference to the attitudes of the speakers. Hence, the truth conditions of moral statements are non‐moral properties. Hare subdivides Naturalism into ‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ varieties. The variety of Naturalism that interests Hare in this chapter is objectivist naturalism, according to which the non‐moral properties are objective. Naturalism, Hare argues, results inevitably in relativism, and any ethical theory that implies relativism must be rejected.

Keywords: descriptivism; Naturalism; objectivist naturalism; relativism; truth conditions

Chapter.  7805 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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