Chapter

The Naturalistic Fallacy

Colin Howson

in Hume's Problem

Published in print November 2000 | ISBN: 9780198250371
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597749 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0007
 The Naturalistic Fallacy

Show Summary Details

Preview

Considers another popular way of evading the force of Hume's argument, Naturalism. According to this doctrine, Hume merely shows why we must give up trying to find top–down justifications for our scientific procedures. Instead, we should use scientific procedures to investigate ways of acquiring knowledge. Naturalism is closely related to Reliabilism, like it claiming that the ordinary canons of evidence are all we need to underwrite the reliability of ordinary inductive procedures. These claims are investigated and shown to rest on a version of the Naturalistic Fallacy.

Keywords: Darwin; naturalism; Naturalistic Fallacy; Quine; realism

Chapter.  4774 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.