Chapter

The Logic of Scientific Discovery

Colin Howson

in Hume's Problem

Published in print November 2000 | ISBN: 9780198250371
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597749 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0009
 The Logic of Scientific Discovery

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Applies the results of Ch. 7 to scientific methodology and shows that they give a logical interpretation of the subjective Bayesian theory of inductive inference. This theory is therefore no more necessarily subjective than deductive logic, consisting as both do of objective logical rules for proceeding from premises to conclusion. In the Bayesian case, the premises are prior probability assignments. It is shown that familiar rules of scientific method are endorsed, and, in particular, the rule that unless there is prior support for a hypothesis, its overall probability will be very small however good the fit with current evidence.

Keywords: Bayes factors; Bayes's Theorem; likelihood; prior probability; probability calculus; scientific method

Chapter.  22210 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science

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