Chapter

Conceptual Analysis and Metaphysical Necessity

Frank Jackson

in From Metaphysics to Ethics

Published in print March 2000 | ISBN: 9780198250616
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597787 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198250614.003.0003
 Conceptual Analysis and Metaphysical Necessity

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Work by Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke has made us sensitive to the distinction between metaphysical necessity and conceptual necessity, and between being necessary and being a priori. This chapter relates these matters to the discussion of conceptual analysis given in Ch. 2 and uses the apparatus of two‐dimensional modal logic and the associated distinction between A‐intensions and C‐intensions (or primary and secondary intensions, respectively, in David Chalmers’ terms) to argue that physicalism is committed to the thesis that the mental is in principle a priori derivable from the physical.

Keywords: Chalmers; conceptual analysis; intension; Kripke; Modal logic; necessity; physicalism; Putnam

Chapter.  12419 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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