Chapter

Chapter Nine

A. W. Moore

in Points of View

Published in print March 2000 | ISBN: 9780198250623
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598050 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198250622.003.0009
 Chapter Nine

Show Summary Details

Preview

I further argue that we can make sense of (ii). This requires a critique of nonsense, since, for reasons that I give, what replaces ‘x’ in the schema must be nonsense. I endorse an austere view of nonsense whereby there is nothing more to nonsense than sheer lack of sense, as in ‘phlump jing ux’. The point is this: because our ineffable knowledge is a mark of our finitude, and because we have a shared aspiration to transcend our finitude, we also have a shared temptation to put our ineffable knowledge into words, which in turn gives us a shared sense of when a piece of nonsense is ‘apt’ to replace ‘x’ in the schema, where ‘aptness’ is a quasi‐aesthetic attribute. This is enough for instances of the schema to count as true or false—and, arguably, for ‘We are shown that transcendental idealism is true’ to count as true.

Keywords: aesthetic; finitude; ineffable; knowledge; nonsense; sense; transcendental idealism

Chapter.  8910 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.