Chapter

Philosophical Objections

Michael Tooley

in Time, Tense, and Causation

Published in print September 2000 | ISBN: 9780198250746
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598623 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198250746.003.0011
 Philosophical Objections

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Discusses several philosophical objections against the view of time defended in the book. Objections against the unreality of the future that relate to bivalence are rejected by denying that disjunction is truth‐functional. The charge that a vicious regress of meta‐times is entailed is shown not to apply to the dynamic view defended here. Mellor's and Dummett's variants of McTaggart's argument against the reality of time are rejected, as are independent arguments of Mellor's against the reality of tensed facts.

Keywords: bivalence; Dummett; McTaggart; Mellor; meta‐time; truth functionality

Chapter.  13825 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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