Chapter

Descartes's Dualisms

Jonathan Bennett

in Learning from Six Philosophers Volume 1

Published in print February 2001 | ISBN: 9780198250913
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597053 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198250916.003.0005

Series: Learning from Six Philosophers (2 Volumes)

 Descartes's Dualisms

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Descartes's property‐dualism is too deep in his thought to be defended. He defends his substance‐dualism twice, once from the premiss that minds are indivisible while matter is not (discussed in Kant's second paralogism), and once from the conceivability of there being mind and no matter. Different possible routes from conceivability to actuality are discussed, and Kripke's defence of one of them is criticized. The chapter discusses Voss's work on Descartes's concept of man.

Keywords: conceivability; Descartes; divisibility; dualism; Kant; Kripke; Voss

Chapter.  9906 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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