Chapter

Regulating the Regulators: Policies for Reform

Christopher Hood, Colin Scott, Oliver James, George Jones and Tony Travers

in Regulation Inside Government

Published in print May 1999 | ISBN: 9780198280996
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191599491 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198280998.003.0010
 Regulating the Regulators: Policies for Reform

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Examines the overall pattern of different forms of control – oversight, mutuality, competition and contrived randomness – and suggests that each could be used more effectively to secure public objectives in regulation inside government. The regulators themselves appear not to apply the principles they apply in regulating to themselves. It is notable that there is little attempt to work out the costs to the public sector bodies of being regulated, and weak evidence of principles of competition and oversight, applied so assiduously to the regulatees, being applied to the regulators. The search for some consistency in approach offers a possible avenue for reform.

Keywords: competition; consistency; contrived randomness; costs; government; mutuality; oversight; public sector; reform; regulation

Chapter.  6835 words. 

Subjects: UK Politics

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