Book

The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

Edited by Pranab Bardhan

Published in print December 1991 | ISBN: 9780198287629
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191595912 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198287623.001.0001

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

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In this book, the authors theorize about the rationale and consequences of some economic institutions and contractual arrangements that are particularly predominant in poor agrarian economies. The models illustrate how some of the tools of advanced economic theory can be fruitfully used in understanding the aspects of age‐old agrarian institutions (like sharecropping, labour contracts, interlinked economic arrangements straddling labour, land, credit and product markets, producer and credit cooperatives, risk‐sharing institutions, etc.).

Keywords: adverse selection; agrarian economies; bargaining; bonded labour; contracts; credit rationing; insurance; moral hazard; principal‐agent model; sharecropping

Book.  416 pages.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Economic Development and Growth

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Table of Contents

Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

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Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization: Methodological Remarks for Development Economics in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

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Theories of Sharecropping in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

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A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

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Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

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Production Relations in Semi‐Arid African Agriculture in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

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Rural Credit Markets: The Structure of Interest Rates, Exploitation, and Efficiency in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

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Credit and Agrarian Class Structure in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

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Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity, and the Dynamics of Inequality in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

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On Choice Among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

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