Chapter

A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts

Clive Bell

in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

Published in print December 1991 | ISBN: 9780198287629
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191595912 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198287623.003.0004

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

 A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts

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Compares and contrasts the solutions yielded by principal‐agent and bargaining formulations of a tenancy contract.

Keywords: agents; bargaining; disagreement payoffs; monitoring; principal; tenancy

Chapter.  8905 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Economic Development and Growth

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