Chapter

Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships

Bhaskar Dutta, Debraj Ray and Kunal Sengupta

in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

Published in print December 1991 | ISBN: 9780198287629
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191595912 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198287623.003.0005

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

 Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships

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In this chapter, the authors use a model of an infinitely repeated principal‐agent relationship where they explore the conditions under which labour contracts with threats of sacking or contract termination will be equilibrium outcomes.

Keywords: agents; equilibrium; eviction; infinite horizon; involuntary unemployment; labour; principal; repeated games; reservation utility; sacking

Chapter.  13886 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Economic Development and Growth

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