Chapter

Peasants' Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts: A Bargaining Theory of Equilibrium Marketing Contracts

Pinhas Zusman

in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

Published in print December 1991 | ISBN: 9780198287629
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191595912 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198287623.003.0015

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

 Peasants' Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts: A Bargaining Theory of Equilibrium Marketing Contracts

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This chapter looks upon the nexus of contracts in the village marketing system as a bilateral bargaining game and explores the properties of the equilibrium set of contracts.

Keywords: bilateral bargaining; commission agent; contracts; equilibrium; marketing intermediaries

Chapter.  8596 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Economic Development and Growth

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