Chapter

Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives

Avishay Braverman and J. Luis Guasch

in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

Published in print December 1991 | ISBN: 9780198287629
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191595912 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198287623.003.0017

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

 Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives

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In this chapter, the authors present an analysis of the motivation, formation, and design of credit cooperatives and show how their degree of success is likely to depend crucially on the particular incentive schemes, extent of control over resources, quality monitoring, and enforcement of punishment rules.

Keywords: credit allocation; credit cooperatives; enforcement; incentives; institutional design; moral hazard; quality monitoring; rules

Chapter.  7963 words. 

Subjects: Economic Development and Growth

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