Food, Care, and Work: The Household as an Allocation Mechanism

Partha Dasgupta

in An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution

Published in print June 1995 | ISBN: 9780198288350
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191596094 | DOI:
 Food, Care, and Work: The Household as an Allocation Mechanism

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The main part of this chapter discusses the household as an allocation mechanism. It has eight sections: (1) gender differentials among adults; (2) allocations among girls and boys; (3) bridewealth and dowry; (4) regional patterns of household allocations: the case of India; (5) marriage and inheritance in India; (6) bargaining theory as a framework for household choice; (7) the Nash programme: a formalization; and (8) bargaining versus maximization of well‐being within the household. An extra and separate section (designated Chapter *11) gives theoretical presentations on two aspects of the axiomatic bargaining theory: (1) the Nash bargaining solution; and (2) the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution.

Keywords: bargaining; bargaining theory; boys; choice; dowry; gender; girls; households; India; inheritance; Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution; marriage; Nash bargaining solution; resource allocation; well‐being

Chapter.  14302 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Economic Development and Growth

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