Chapter

Co‐Ordination and Leadership in the Unregulated Common Property: Some Lessons from Game Theory

Jean‐Marie Baland and Jean‐Philippe Platteau

in Halting Degradation of Natural Resources

Published in print March 2000 | ISBN: 9780198290612
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191601613 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198290616.003.0006
 Co‐Ordination and Leadership in the Unregulated Common Property: Some Lessons from Game Theory

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This chapter analyses the contribution of game theory in understanding the problems of unregulated common property. It argues that the problems of resource exploitation may or may not be adequately described as prisoner’s dilemma games. Emphasis is given to heterogeneous situations in which different types of actors interact. The threat posed by small and large groups of minority actors to the stability of coordinated solutions is examined.

Keywords: game theory; unregulated common property; coordination; leadership; resource exploitation

Chapter.  18434 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Economic Development and Growth

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