‘Justice as mutual advantage’ theorists argue that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested persons would accept in regulating the pursuit of their self‐interest. Taking David Gauthier's theory as an exemplar of this approach, it is argued that justice as mutual advantage cannot close the gap between morality and self‐interest. The conclusion is that the value of morality cannot be only that it furthers self‐interest, although this is an important part of any moral theory that is to have an adequate account of moral motivation.

‘Justice as mutual advantage’ theorists argue that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested persons would accept in regulating the pursuit of their self‐interest. Taking David Gauthier's theory as an exemplar of this approach, it is argued that justice as mutual advantage cannot close the gap between morality and self‐interest. The conclusion is that the value of morality cannot be only that it furthers self‐interest, although this is an important part of any moral theory that is to have an adequate account of moral motivation.