Italy and the IGC: Negotiating External Discipline, Avoiding Exclusion, 1990–1991

Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone

in The Road To Maastricht

Published in print October 1999 | ISBN: 9780198296386
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191599125 | DOI:
 Italy and the IGC: Negotiating External Discipline, Avoiding Exclusion, 1990–1991

Show Summary Details


Italy's maximalist negotiating positions—of a binding timetable, strong central institutions for the transition, and flexible entry conditions—were soon confronted in 1991 by the realization of a bargaining weakness. The latter stemmed from the domestic economic position, but also from the shift of the Mitterrand administration towards the negotiating positions adopted by the German–Dutch policy coalition. This context explains the successes and failures of the Italian negotiators in the IGC. Some technical influence was achieved. There was little scope for them to obtain a more favourable outcome, given that they were outside the Franco–German axis and an alternative coalition was not available. Above all, Italian negotiators had to avoid the risk of exclusion from EMU, which would have constituted a profound domestic shock.

Keywords: Giulio Andreotti; automaticity; coalitions; Mario Draghi; intergovernmental conference; monetary institutions; negotiation; timetable; Tommaso Padoa‐Schioppa; Umberto Vattani

Chapter.  13406 words. 

Subjects: European Union

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.