Chapter

Information, Equilibrium, and Efficiency Concepts

Markus K. Brunnermeier

in Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information

Published in print January 2001 | ISBN: 9780198296980
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191596025 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198296983.003.0001
Information, Equilibrium, and Efficiency Concepts

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Ch. 1 shows the reader how to model asymmetric information and knowledge in theoretical economics. It also introduces the concept of higher‐order knowledge. For the analysis of bubbles it is important to draw a distinction between mutual knowledge, e.g. all traders know that the price is too high, and common knowledge, i.e. they all know this and that all know and so on. Prices are determined in equilibrium. The two most commonly used equilibrium concepts in market settings with asymmetric information are the competitive Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) concept and the strategic Bayesian Nash Equilibrium concept. The chapter compares and contrasts both equilibrium concepts and also highlights their conceptual problems. This chapter also introduces and contrasts the two efficiency concepts: informational efficiency and allocative efficiency.

Keywords: allocative efficiency; asymmetric information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; common knowledge; informational efficiency; knowledge; mutual knowledge; rational expectations equilibrium

Chapter.  12456 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Financial Markets

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