Chapter

Impartiality and Congruence

Susan Mendus

in Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy

Published in print April 2002 | ISBN: 9780198297819
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191599880 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198297815.003.0005
Impartiality and Congruence

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Argues that a form of impartialism that is grounded in the partial concerns we have for others can be shown to be congruent with the good of the agent, and that such congruence does not imply commitment to a specific comprehensive conception of the good. If correct, this argument has important consequences for liberalism at the political level. It suggests that the defence of stability, which Rawls advocates in A Theory of Justice need not depend upon commitment to a comprehensive, and Kantian, conception of the good. Justice can be shown to have moral priority, while at the same time acknowledging the permanence of pluralism about the good.

Keywords: good; justice; Immanuel Kant; liberalism; moral impartialism; moral priority; pluralism; political impartialism; John Rawls; stability

Chapter.  17926 words. 

Subjects: Political Theory

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