Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation

Kaare Strøm

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print November 2003 | ISBN: 9780198297840
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602016 | DOI:

Series: Comparative Politics

Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation

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Identifies three motivations for political delegation (capacity, competence, collective action problems) and discusses agency problems and mechanisms of accountability. An ideal-typical form of parliamentary democracy is introduced to reveal that singularity and indirect delegation are key ingredients of delegation and accountability. Develops a delegation model that reveals more agency loss (policy slippage) in parliamentary democracy than in two versions of presidentialism. Parliamentary democracies use ex ante screening by cohesive political parties to protect against adverse selection. Delegation and accountability make parliamentary democracies more efficient, but frequently less transparent. Identifies the implications of different forms of parliamentarism, such as Westminster parliamentarism, pivotal parliamentarism, and constrained parliamentarism.

Keywords: accountability; adverse selection; alternational parliamentarism; collegial presidentialism; competitive presidentialism; constrained parliamentarism; indirect delegation; moral hazard; pivotal parliamentarism; singularity; transparency; Westminster parliamentarism

Chapter.  25594 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Comparative Politics

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