Chapter

Belgium: Delegation and Accountability under Partitocratic Rule

Lieven De Winter and Patrick Dumont

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print November 2003 | ISBN: 9780198297840
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602016 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019829784X.003.0006

Series: Comparative Politics

Belgium: Delegation and Accountability under Partitocratic Rule

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Reviews the mechanisms of delegation and accountability in post-war Belgium prior to the major reforms of the 1990s and the subsequent reforms. Discusses how political parties dominate these processes and reduce many actors in the parliamentary chain of delegation (MPs, ministers, civil servants) to mere party agents. Partitocracy is unavoidable and even functional for political system stability in Belgium, but it does come at the cost of undermining political legitimacy and governability.

Keywords: coalition maintenance mechanisms; electoral responsiveness; electoral rules; federalism; linguistic symmetry; monitoring; neo-corporatism; partitocracy; pillarization; political parties

Chapter.  14192 words. 

Subjects: Comparative Politics

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