Chapter

Germany: Multiple Veto Points, Informal Coordination, and Problems of Hidden Action

Thomas Saalfeld

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print November 2003 | ISBN: 9780198297840
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602016 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019829784X.003.0010

Series: Comparative Politics

Germany: Multiple Veto Points, Informal Coordination, and Problems of Hidden Action

Show Summary Details

Preview

Argues that the German federal system was designed to avoid past problems with instability and abuse of power. This constitutional design disperses political power among many political and economic actors and leads to a complicated delegation chain. However, the German constitution successfully achieves democratic regime stability, a broad democratic consensus, and a high level of government and policy stability. The weaknesses of the German political system are efficiency problems (high transaction costs for policy change) and problems of political accountability and transparency.

Keywords: accountability; basic Law; constitutional design; federalism; hidden action problems; informal coordination; regime stability; transaction costs; transparency; veto points

Chapter.  14349 words. 

Subjects: Comparative Politics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.