Chapter

Luxembourg: A Case of More ‘Direct’ Delegation and Accountability

Patrick Dumont and Lieven De Winter

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print November 2003 | ISBN: 9780198297840
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602016 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019829784X.003.0015

Series: Comparative Politics

Luxembourg: A Case of More ‘Direct’ Delegation and Accountability

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Featuring an indirect chain of delegation and a reasonable correspondence to the singularity principle, the Grand Dutchy of Luxembourg presents a number of characteristics that approximate the ideal type of parliamentary democracy. The country is a unitary parliamentary monarchy with a unicameral Parliament, and it has never used a referendum in the post-war period. Yet, a number of domestic institutions and policy-making procedures deviate from this ideal-typical picture, including collective decision-making within the cabinet and executive-legislative relations. Another constraint has been the country’s involvement in international organizations and arrangements that continuously reduce its sovereignty and thus the significance of the national chain of delegation and accountability.

Keywords: cabinet stability; constitutional court; interpellations; neo-corporatist professional chambers; panachage voting; parliamentary committee of investigation; unicameral parliament; unitary state

Chapter.  12084 words. 

Subjects: Comparative Politics

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