Chapter

Spain: Delegation and Accountability in a Newly Established Democracy

Carlos Flores Juberías

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print November 2003 | ISBN: 9780198297840
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602016 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019829784X.003.0019

Series: Comparative Politics

Spain: Delegation and Accountability in a Newly Established Democracy

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The most prominent features of the delegative chain in Spanish parliamentarism are an imbalance between delegation and accountability in general and an extreme concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister. There is a lot more delegation than accountability when it comes to the chain that links voters to MPs and MPs to the Prime Minister. Voters simply cannot influence the actions of their representatives and MPs are similarly in a weak position vis-à-vis their party’s leadership and the Prime Minister. On the other hand, regarding the part of the chain that links the Prime Minister to cabinet ministers and cabinet ministers to civil servants, the observation is the opposite: delegation shrinks, while accountability soars.

Keywords: authoritarian political culture; autonomous communities; departmental principle; judicial review; oligarchic political parties; parliamentary monarchy; personalism; prime ministerial leadership principle; principle of collegiality

Chapter.  10585 words. 

Subjects: Comparative Politics

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