Chapter

Challenges to Parliamentary Democracy

Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print November 2003 | ISBN: 9780198297840
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602016 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019829784X.003.0023

Series: Comparative Politics

Challenges to Parliamentary Democracy

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In this chapter, we take a closer look at democratic accountability outcomes. The evidence strongly and broadly suggests that cohesive and competitive political parties and governments help reduce the risks of democratic delegation. Specifically, executive cohesion strongly and significantly reduces the risks of corruption and fiscal indiscipline. Party competition, on the other hand, reduces rent extraction and promotes general satisfaction with democracy. The rest of the chapter reviews the broader lessons of this study, with respect to parliamentary democracy, parliamentary governance, political institutions, and the gap between citizens and their political representatives.

Keywords: accountability; corruption; Europeanization; executive cohesion; leisure shirking; party competition; policy coordination; policy divergence; rent extraction

Chapter.  20972 words. 

Subjects: Comparative Politics

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