Chapter

Methodology and Scientific Realism

Paul Horwich

in Truth

Second edition

Published in print December 1998 | ISBN: 9780198752233
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597732 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198752237.003.0004
 Methodology and Scientific Realism

Show Summary Details

Preview

Insofar as the notion of truth is legitimately deployed in metaphysics and the philosophy of science, it can play no more than its minimalistic function. This idea is illustrated here via discussion of (1) the contrast between deflationism and relativism; (2) the thesis that science progresses towards the truth; (3) various debates between realism and anti‐realism (which are shown not to concern the concept of truth—rather, a single notion, fully captured by minimalism, is deployed on each side to help articulate its position).

Keywords: anti‐realism; deflationism; metaphysics; philosophy of science; realism; relativism; science; truth

Chapter.  6029 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.