Preview
The idea that truth serves merely as a device of generalization, and that this must constrain its role in philosophical theorizing, is further illustrated in discussions of a range of semantic issues: (1) the nature of understanding (including the viability of Davidson's truth‐conditional approach); (2) definitions of falsity and negation; (3) foundations of logic; (4) the existence of truth‐value gaps; (5) the import of empty names; (6) the proper treatment of vagueness and sorites paradoxes; and (7) the status of ethical assertions.
Keywords: Davidson; empty names; falsity; logic; negation; sorites paradox; truth; truth‐conditional; truth‐value; understanding; vagueness
Chapter. 6725 words.
Subjects: Philosophy of Language
Go to Oxford Scholarship Online » abstract
Full text: subscription required
How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian
Buy this work at Oxford University Press »
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.
