Chapter

Meaning and Logic

Paul Horwich

in Truth

Second edition

Published in print December 1998 | ISBN: 9780198752233
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597732 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198752237.003.0005
 Meaning and Logic

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The idea that truth serves merely as a device of generalization, and that this must constrain its role in philosophical theorizing, is further illustrated in discussions of a range of semantic issues: (1) the nature of understanding (including the viability of Davidson's truth‐conditional approach); (2) definitions of falsity and negation; (3) foundations of logic; (4) the existence of truth‐value gaps; (5) the import of empty names; (6) the proper treatment of vagueness and sorites paradoxes; and (7) the status of ethical assertions.

Keywords: Davidson; empty names; falsity; logic; negation; sorites paradox; truth; truth‐conditional; truth‐value; understanding; vagueness

Chapter.  6725 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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