Chapter

Value and Nature

James Griffin

in Value Judgement

Published in print January 1998 | ISBN: 9780198752318
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597541 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198752318.003.0005
 Value and Nature

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Can value judgements be ‘correct’ or ‘true’ and, if so, in what sense? This chapter argues for the proposal in the preceding chapter that any plausible account of how we identify prudential values is more complex than is indicated by a simple reductive naturalist model, the Humean model or certain forms of intuitionist model. The chapter argues that the most plausible account will give a role to both recognition and reaction, but without the sharp separation between them or the priority to one of them that the Humean model makes central. It develops an error theory for judgements about human interests and for a kind of realism about these interests and events of their being met or not met.

Keywords: error theory; ethical realism; ethical truth; Hume; intuitionism; naturalism; value judgement

Chapter.  6585 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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