Chapter

Static Analysis

Fernando Vega‐Redondo

in Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour

Published in print September 1996 | ISBN: 9780198774723
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191596971 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198774729.003.0002
 Static Analysis

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Presents the basic theoretical framework and introduces the key notion of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). The chapter addresses the issue of existence of ESS, the relationship of ESS to the standard game‐theoretic equilibrium concepts (such as Nash Equilibrium), the considerations arising in asymmetric contexts, or the implications of finite populations. It closes with an example on the evolution of cheap talk.

Keywords: asymmetric contests; cheap talk; Evolutionarily Stable Strategy; finite populations; Nash Equilibrium; playing the field; random matching; refinements

Chapter.  15945 words. 

Subjects: Microeconomics

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