Chapter

Basic Dynamic Analysis

Fernando Vega‐Redondo

in Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour

Published in print September 1996 | ISBN: 9780198774723
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191596971 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198774729.003.0003
 Basic Dynamic Analysis

Show Summary Details

Preview

Approaches evolutionary analysis from a dynamic viewpoint by introducing the Replicator Dynamics (RD)—a simple formalization of Darwinian Natural Selection. It revisits many of the issues addressed in Ch. 2, such as the relationship of stable outcomes to game‐theoretic equilibrium concepts. The chapter closes with an application to the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma played in a large population through random matching.

Keywords: dynamics; evolution; Natural Selection; Prisoner's Dilemma; Replicator Dynamics

Chapter.  19719 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Microeconomics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.