Chapter

‘Naturalism’

R. M. Hare

in The Language of Morals

Published in print March 1963 | ISBN: 9780198810773
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597619 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198810776.003.0005
‘Naturalism’

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Having discussed prescriptive language in Part I, Hare turns to value‐words in Parts II and III. He begins by arguing that though value‐words are ‘supervenient’ or ‘consequential’ (i.e. if two situations are exactly alike in their non‐evaluative features, then they cannot be different in their evaluative features), they are so not as a matter of analytic entailment, e.g. because ‘good’ means ‘most conducive to pleasure’. Hare's argument for thus rebutting all forms of naturalism (in G.E. Moore's sense) is that any definition of ‘good’ in this way would prevent us from commending something we want to commend.

Keywords: good; G.E. Moore; naturalism; prescriptive language; supervenience; value‐words

Chapter.  5222 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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