‘Ought’ and Imperatives

R. M. Hare

in The Language of Morals

Published in print March 1963 | ISBN: 9780198810773
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597619 | DOI:
 ‘Ought’ and Imperatives

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Defends Hare's claim that value‐judgements entail imperatives. He does so by first showing that cases appearing to undermine his claim are not genuine value‐judgements but rather statements of sociological fact (the conventional use of ‘good’) or of psychological fact (‘I have a feeling that I ought to X’). Second, Hare argues that value‐judgements cannot be reduced to statements of fact because (1) we do use value‐judgements evaluatively (entailing at least one imperative), but (2) no imperatives can be derived from indicatives.

Keywords: good; imperatives; indicatives; ought; statements of fact; value judgements

Chapter.  6028 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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